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Given the seriousness for both women and men of misunderstanding or mis-
categorising sexual victimization and coercion, scholarly engagement with this
topic must be self-critical and careful about its methods and conclusions. This
article seeks to test the plausibility and justiﬁability of some key claims made
within feminist scholarship as regards the implications of the traditional sexual
script and the prevalence and impact of the ‘‘real rape’’ myth. The criticisms
offered below with respect to these claims identify three problems: (a) that evidence
that would challenge carceral feminists’ framing of the traditional sexual script as
essentially a blueprint for rape is either marginalized or excluded from consider-
ation altogether; (b) that within that framing the scripted roles of the coercive
male and the passive female who is victimized have been allowed to solidify into
immovable and immutable stereotypes; (c) that studies purporting to show that
rape myth acceptance is highly prevalent and inﬂuential on popular attitudes are
ﬂawed in ways hitherto not fully acknowledged or explored.
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with this topic must be self-critical and careful about its methods and
conclusions. This article seeks to test the plausibility and justiﬁability of
some key claims made within feminist scholarship as regards the implications
of the traditional sexual script and the prevalence and impact of the ‘‘real
rape’’ myth. The particular strain of feminist thought focused on here is
sometimes known (at least by its detractors) as ‘‘carceral,’’ since it represents
a view that more criminal convictions of men signiﬁes an advancement for
gender justice. Carceral feminism has been criticized already for variously
fetishizing female victimization and disempowerment, disingenuously deny-
ing its own inﬂuence on legal policy, and ignoring the harmful effects of
using the violence of state coercion as a means of promoting women’s
interests.1 However, the criticisms offered below focus on three speciﬁc
problems with that tradition and its claims about sex and rape: (a) evidence
that would challenge a carceral feminist framing of the traditional sexual
script as essentially a blueprint for rape is either marginalized or excluded
from consideration altogether; (b) within that framing the scripted roles of
the coercive male and the passive female who is victimized have been allowed
to solidify into immovable and immutable stereotypes; (c) studies purporting
to show that rape myth acceptance is highly prevalent and inﬂuential on
popular attitudes are ﬂawed in ways hitherto not fully acknowledged or
explored. All three of these problems relate to claims that carry serious
implications for criminal law, justice, and policy and as such warrant careful
scrutiny.
This critique will proceed by placing relevant feminist arguments along-
side empirical research on sexual consent-giving behaviors, as well as by
scrutinizing methods and analyses by which those arguments are made out.
What this research indicates is that, notwithstanding the manifest problems
inherent in the traditional sexual script and its enactment, nevertheless
non-victimizing, non-coercive sex can and does occur in a variety of ways
that deserve to be recognized as such despite being so scripted, even in the
absence of unambiguous and direct agreement between sexual partners. In
the ﬁrst section of this article, therefore, it is argued that we must be wary of
the carceral feminist tendency to frame traditional sexual script enactment
as essentially and necessarily coercive and victimizing. It may indeed be
right to say that by building in a necessary assumption of victimization in
1. For further critical commentary on ‘‘carceral’’ feminism, see Khan (2014) and Halley
(2008).
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situations involving, say, sex that is not positively desired for its own sake,
involving an actively pursuing and possibly forceful male and a passive
woman, or a woman engaged in sex whilst intoxicated, we will catch more
men who have committed rape and sexual assault. It is also true that
women may themselves be unwilling or unable to acknowledge that they
have been victimized by coercive or manipulative male strategies (Peterson
& Muehlenhard, 2007; Littleton, 2011; Coy, Thiara, & Kelly, 2011; Turch-
ik, Probst, Irvin, Chau, & Gidyez, 2010; Krahe´, Bieneck, & Scheinberger-
Olwig, 2007; Busby, 2012; Gotell, 2012). However, there is a danger that
building such assumptions into our thinking also implicitly relies on the
same principle that makes rape myth acceptance so odious: in judging
a particular incident, we rely not on information as to what actually hap-
pened but on a generalized set of beliefs as to what usually happens.
Associated with the carceral feminist orthodoxy regarding the traditional
sexual script is the similarly orthodox explanation for attrition rates in rape
cases: that in the popular mindset, real rape typically conforms to a stereo-
type involving violence, an outdoors location, and a pathological stranger,
which is qualitatively distinct from what rape much more commonly looks
like: committed by an acquaintance, friend, partner, or former partner, and
may not involve extrinsic violence, injury, torn clothes, obvious signs of
trauma, or prompt reporting; and that even if counter-stereotypical rape is
itself still visible despite this false belief, jurors’ attentions and attitudes are
nevertheless sufﬁciently drawn by it to become confused and reluctant to
convict in the more common scenario (Ellison & Munro, 2010; Temkin,
2010).2 The second part of this article critiques this analysis, and in par-
ticular suggests that the research involving rape scripts and mock juries that
purports to demonstrate both the prevalence and inﬂuence of the real rape
myth on popular perceptions is ﬂawed in some important respects.
Contextualizing the Question: What this article is about and what it
is not about
Given the fraught political climate associated with the themes and argu-
ments under consideration here, it may be helpful at this point to offer
2. Burton (2013) reports on how police may be inﬂuenced by these sorts of factors in
handling and categorizing rape complaints; Anderson (2010, p. 651) reports on research in
the United States indicating that ‘‘most rape victims do not suffer the kind of genital trauma
that hospital staffs can detect.’’
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a very brief explanation of the article’s scope and positioning, and of what
lies outside of those parameters. Firstly, why a ‘‘critique’’ of feminist argu-
ments when these may represent the best hope for critically rethinking
entrenched gender norms? This article does not position itself as a call to
legal actors and decision-makers of criminal justice to disregard feminist
insights as such. Being concerned about sexual victimization, violence,
coercion, and the like does not commit us to any speciﬁc approach to these
matters; rather, it commits us to being self-critical about the theory we use
in our approach. Critiquing speciﬁc feminist studies and arguments (as this
article does) is not a betrayal of victims or complainants, nor does it
undermine feminist scholarship. This article does not seek to marginalize
legitimate concerns about script adherence, nor does it call into question
the seriousness or the actuality of female sexual victimization. What it does
do by contrast is raise questions about how victimization is framed within
a particular (albeit currently highly inﬂuential) feminist tradition, and the
extent to which this framing can be reﬁned or rethought in capturing the
complexity of the relevant issues. After all, if we are serious about under-
standing and tackling actual instances of coercion and victimization, we
cannot afford to become too comfortable in our preferred scholarly struc-
tures, no matter how well they accord with our political or moral worldview.
Although the scholarship critiqued here might all be categorized broadly
as feminist inasmuch as it seeks to bring to light particular risks, harms, and
disadvantages for women, my aim is not to oppose feminist scholarship, nor
even to critique feminism as such. There is too much diversity and dis-
agreement within feminist research for that in any case. As I have said, the
particular target of my criticisms is a strain of feminism that, as Khan (2014,
p. 265) puts it, ‘‘allies itself with a criminalizing state that purports to
address systemic and social problems through punishment,’’ and on the
subject of sexual offending therefore regards increasing the numbers of
convictions for rape and sexual assault a primary aim. In focusing on this
particular intellectual strain, it is not my intention to deny that there are
many others, and indeed I have been inﬂuenced by feminisms that seek to
challenge criminal justice solutions (Cossman, 2011; Khan, 2014).
A ﬁnal point to make here concerns the legal and theoretical content of
this article. The discussion below of the scripts, myths, and stereotypes
with regard to consent and culpability takes a broadly legal perspective, but
without delving into the speciﬁcs of any particular jurisdiction, legislation,
or case law. Although of course the concepts debated have particular
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doctrinal, evidential, and philosophical dimensions, this article will not
venture into detail on these matters. Therefore, important questions about
legal and philosophical deﬁnitions of consent and a defendant’s mistaken
belief in consent,3 or about the inclusion or exclusion of evidence in a trial
regarding a complainant’s past sexual history, are beyond the scope of the
article.4 Where terms such as ‘‘the accused’’ and ‘‘the complainant’’ are
used, this limitation should be borne in mind. Furthermore, although the
term ‘‘rape’’ is most often used in this article to refer to the relevant type of
wrongdoing, this is not to exclude from consideration sexual assaults that
do not involve penile penetration, nor to exclude jurisdictions such as
Canada that do not recognize rape as a distinct legal category.
This article begins, then, by plotting out the cultural contours of the
so-called traditional sexual script and the demonstrated ambivalence of
consent cues for individuals who enact this script in their sexual lives.
It then moves on to outlining and critiquing the ways in which that script
is mischaracterized in carceral feminist scholarship as essentially a blueprint
for male sexual violence against women. The article considers how this
leads to gender stereotypes actually being reinforced by feminist analysis
and to questionable claims about the prevalence and inﬂuence of the real
rape myth.
I . THE TRAD I T IONAL SEXUAL SCR IPT IN THEORY
AND PRACT ICE
In thinking about how to form a critical perspective on discourses of
victimization, we start with the view that it is important to listen to what
individuals actually say about their own experiences. This is certainly not to
deny that in many cases there may be reasons for doubting the ability or
willingness of individuals themselves to recognize that they are either a per-
petrator or victim of sexually coercive behaviors. We know that individuals’
sexual behaviors and attitudes are typically scripted according to sociocultural
3. In Canada, the Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46) s. 273.2 stipulates that the
accused cannot rely on his belief in the complainant’s consent unless he took ‘‘reasonable
steps’’ to ascertain it. In England and Wales, Sexual Offences Act 2003s. 1(2) requires the
accused to ‘‘reasonably believe’’ that the complainant was consenting.
4. See Jones (2012) on the ﬁrst point, and Tadros (2006) and Dsouza (2013) on the
second.
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norms, and so it would be naı¨ve to assume that apparent choices are always
straightforwardly and authentically free and unconstrained (Littleton, 2011;
Coy et al., 2011; Turchik et al., 2010; Krahe´ et al., 2007). This section
acknowledges the importance of feminist arguments that the traditional
sexual script and sex role enactment provides a blueprint for behavior that
may well be coercive and victimizing. But at the same time, it argues that it is
not without signiﬁcance that traditionally scripted sexual norms are in many
cases actually experienced as non-coercive and non-victimizing, and in seek-
ing to distinguish between appropriately criminal and noncriminal sexual
behavior, these experiences are instructive.
A. Theorizing the Traditional Sexual Script
The traditional sexual script casts men in the role of initiators of sex: single-
minded and mechanical in their pursuit of sexual satisfaction, and ready to
say and do whatever it takes to get it and thereby bolster their manly self-
identity. Women are by contrast cast in the role of gatekeepers of sex and
hence also of men’s and society’s sexual morals: less driven by the need for
sexual satisfaction and more attuned to a sense of vulnerability—to preg-
nancy and to social disapproval consequent upon allowing men free reign
to pursue their pleasure (Chapleau & Oswald, 2013).
The available empirical research on sexual behaviors and attitudes attests
to a widespread belief that this order of things continues to be normal,
normative, and natural by both men and women—albeit also challenged
by individuals who for various reasons feel able to escape its bonds—and
that it accurately describes the way many people actually conduct and
reﬂect upon their sexual lives. Identities may not be quite as simplistically
dualistic as active male sexual subjects on the one hand and passive female
sexual objects on the other, but the research indicates a continuing rele-
vance of this paradigm. A generation ago, LaPlante, McCormick, and
Brannigan (1980) found that men were expected to and many did use a very
wide range of methods to overcome women’s resistance, whereas women in
turn were expected to and did use every means available to avoid or at least
delay sex. This ﬁnding has more recently been repeated both in terms of
beliefs commonly held by men and women, and in sexual practises and
attitudes reported (Sakaluk, Todd, Milhausen, & Lachowsky, 2013).
What the literature suggests is that there has been (and continues to be)
a strong acceptance and reafﬁrmation of a script for heterosexual norms
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amongst both men and women, and that this informs what many people
understand to constitute the meaning-giving context for consensual sexual
relations (Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; Sakaluk et al., 2013; Masters, Casey,
Wells, & Morrison, 2013). But since consent-giving according to the tradi-
tional script presupposes a more passive role for women, with the conse-
quent implication that males may feel that their scripted role entitles them
to use deceptive or coercive means, feminist critical engagements with this
topic have often depicted a good deal of traditionally scripted sexual activity
as so limiting of female agency as to render consent invalid or at the very
least severely compromised.5 Studies informed by a feminist framing script
such as those of Beckett et al. (2013), Coy, Kelly, Elvines, Garner, and
Kanyeredzi (2013), and Berelowitz, Firmin, Edwards, and Gulyurtlu
(2012) take issue with at least three implications of the traditional script.
Firstly, sexual acts that a woman agrees to only, for example, to keep the
peace in a difﬁcult or potentially abusive relationship or to gain something
else (say money, drugs, recognition, or affection) may be classiﬁed in liberal
theory and law as consensual, since it is open to a jury to ﬁnd this amounts
to making a valid choice.6 Secondly, if an incident involves sexual activity
that may have been wanted up to a certain point but not actually consented
to (say, due to a woman’s incapacity at a crucial time), then a rape prose-
cution may also fail on the grounds of a lack of mens rea on the accused’s
part (see Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007).7 Thirdly, where a woman con-
sents to sexual activity X (say, vaginal sex), which the male partner assumes
to constitute tacit consent to sexual activity Y (say, anal sex), sexual attitudes
research suggests that some people who afﬁrm the traditional sexual script
may not recognize any wrongdoing (Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013).
5. See, e.g., Beckett et al. (2013) and Berelowitz et al. (2012) on sexual and exploitative
attitudes and behaviors in gangs and groups, and Coy et al. (2013) on adolescents.
6. A positive (afﬁrmative) understanding of sexual consent characterizes the English,
Canadian, and many of the American criminal laws. In England and Wales, s. 74 of the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 deﬁnes consent as having been present when an individual
‘‘agreed by choice, with the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’’ The Canadian Code
(s. 273.1) requires ‘‘the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual
activity in question.’’ The California Penal Code s. 261.6 refers to ‘‘positive cooperation in
act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will.’’
7. Constraints on space preclude a fuller account of the evidential or procedural
dimensions of this point as it might arise in a trial; my point here is simply to highlight
a broadly speaking ‘‘liberal’’ legal perspective on the traditional sexual script and
a feminist critique of the same.
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Reece (2013) has argued recently that to credit indirect, ambivalent, and
ambiguous words or actions as consent cannot amount to ‘‘rape myth
acceptance,’’ since in fact we do live in a culture in which such ambivalent
words or actions actually are treated as such by sexual agents who enact the
traditional sexual script. Reece therefore calls these ‘‘sex myths’’: less accu-
rately thought of as necessarily false beliefs about rape and more accurately
as beliefs about sex that may be true or false depending on the context. She
concludes that since no one thing (not even ‘‘yes’’) means consent in every
case, indirect and potentially ambiguous cues may constitute consent cues
in certain cases according to the normative expectations of men and
women, allowing for the possibility of miscommunication (461–465). In
the context of a rape trial, for example, the task for jurors is thus to draw
out the correct legal implication from a set of facts that are themselves
already embedded in an existing sexual culture of meanings and norms.
The dual and ambivalent character of the traditional sexual script is thus
the nub of the problem of identifying victimization.
Reece’s comments provoked controversy because, by suggesting that
something like ‘‘come in for coffee’’ might actually stand in for explicit
consent to sex in the minds of individuals following the traditional script,
she appeared to reinforce the very myths that feminist scholarship has so
vociferously sought to combat. And although she acknowledges the impli-
cation of her argument—that ‘‘the everyday taken-for-granted normative
forms of heterosexuality work as a cultural scaffolding for rape’’ (465)—
Reece has been criticized for treating this ‘‘scaffolding’’ merely as a back-
ground against which jurors form their judgments more or less neutrally.
She arguably therefore fails fully to appreciate the impact of a sexist and
patriarchal heterosexual culture upon jurors’ attitudes (Conaghan & Rus-
sell 2014, p. 29–31).
But however uncomfortable it may be, it is precisely this duality of the
traditional sexual script—and the possibility that what we call ‘‘myths’’ may
actually be true for some people in the way they enact their preferred
sexual scripts—that is relevant for our examination of the framing of sexual
victimization. Unless we are prepared to believe that the traditional
sexual script and rape are necessarily one and the same (i.e., that it is
essentially and merely a script that is imposed coercively upon women
by men who rape), then discerning the difference between rape and sex
will sometimes be ﬁnely balanced, and based on contextual clues about the
meaning of ambivalent words, actions, and inactions. This does not mean
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we must reject Conaghan and Russell’s (2014) afﬁrmation that the deﬁni-
tion of a rape myth may include beliefs that are (at least in some contexts)
true. Indeed, a deﬁnition of rape myths now widely accepted within fem-
inist circles—‘‘descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e., about its
causes, context, consequences, perpetrators, victims, and their interaction)
that serve to deny, downplay, or justify sexual violence that men commit
against women’’ (Gerger, Kley, Bohner, & Siebler, 2007; cited by, among
others, Temkin, 2010, and Ellison & Munro, 2010)—is broad enough to
include both true and false beliefs.8 However, this duality in the traditional
sexual script opens up the possibility of non-victimizing, non-coercive sex
without directly or explicitly communicated consent. The crucial point of
departure between a carceral feminist framing of the traditional sexual
script and the view taken here in challenging that framing lies therefore
in thinking about how central victimization is to that script, and the extent
to which scepticism toward a rape claim based on what we know about
sexual script adherence can justiﬁably be condemned as recourse to a re-
victimizing myth endorsement. The next subsection explores sociological
sex research that speaks to this ambivalence between the presence and
absence of consent cues in enactments of the traditional sexual script.
B. Living the Traditional Sexual Script: Indirect and Ambivalent
Consent Cues in Sex Research
In framing gendered sexual victimization, the troubling question about
whether anything other than a fully unambiguous, direct, and uncon-
strained agreement might constitute valid consent lies at the heart of
a debate about the relationship between the traditional sexual script and
rape. There are some who argue that for women to bear the responsibility
of saying ‘‘no’’ in contexts in which silence might be taken for ‘‘yes’’ is
necessary to avoid convicting and punishing men who lack mens rea
(Panichas 2006, p. 634–635; Dsouza, 2013). On the other hand, the idea
that law should give credence to the view that silence or passivity might
8. Gerger et al. explain (2007) that they arrived at that deﬁnition because it is ‘‘more
expedient to deﬁne rape myths not as false, but rather as ‘wrong’ in an ethical sense,’’ and
because empirical falsiﬁcation and prevalence are ‘‘better treated as empirical problems
rather than matters of deﬁnition’’ (423). However, the tendency within that literature to
think of these beliefs as necessarily ‘‘highly spurious’’ (Ellison &Munro, 2010, p. 782) if not
downright ‘‘false’’ (Temkin, 2010p. 715) is also fairly evident.
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ever be allowed to stand in for actual consent strikes others as exposing
a dangerous sexism at the heart of traditionally scripted sexual norms that
anticipate such passivity only in women (Coy et al., 2013, p. 60). On this
view, to give the accused such an opportunity problematically shifts
responsibility and blame for rape from him onto the complainant and
hence more often than not onto women (Clark & Carroll, 2008; Conaghan
& Russell, 2014; Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999). It furthermore seeks to
ﬁnd excuses for male coercion in the sexist and patriarchal structures of
culture that to a certain extent legitimize male uses of ‘‘verbal coercion,
psychological pressure, and (within limits) physical force’’ as a part of
‘‘normal heterosexual seduction’’ (Ellison & Munro, 2010, p. 792).9
But if our aim is to understand how victimizing and coercive sexual
behaviors are different to non-victimizing and non-coercive behaviors, then
critiquing the gender imbalances in the way the traditional script plays out
cannot be the whole picture. That individuals feel that reliance on non-
verbal initiations and consent cues are both sufﬁcient and preferable is
reported by, for example, Humphreys (2007) (69% of male respondents
in a Canadian university and 44% of females) and by Vannier and O’Sul-
livan (2011), and that ‘‘no response’’ as a way to signal consent is used by
both men and women is reported by Hickman and Muehlenhard (1999).
Lim and Roloff’s (1999) research on the responses of American undergrad-
uate students to various impairments to consent, reports a fairly widespread
acceptance that both verbal and nonverbal cues may constitute consent in
the absence of coercion or manipulation.
In a study of female undergraduate students’ sexual experiences in Kan-
sas, Peterson and Muehlenhard (2007) report that ‘‘individuals sometimes
consent to unwanted sex and sometimes do not consent to wanted sex,’’
and that sex can be experienced by both men and women as enthusiasti-
cally wanted without being consented to at all (81). Their study sheds useful
light on whether, in the endeavor to distinguish victimizing from non-
victimizing sexual behavior, what we look for is explicit and direct consent
necessarily or something else. Although their research subjects’ self-
reported experiences of ‘‘wanted-but-unconsented-to’’ sex were in many
cases found to be instances of unacknowledged rape for which women
9. On this point, see also Conaghan and Russell (2014), Clark and Carroll, (2008),
Ellison and Munro (2013), Littleton (2011), Frith and Kitzinger (1997), and Kitzinger and
Frith (1999).
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found ways to blame themselves,10 this was not always the case. Quoting
Peterson and Muehlenhard:
[N]ot all experiences in which the woman was intoxicated seemed coercive
or nonconsensual. For example, we excluded one woman from our rape
group although she reported having been drunk and high on marijuana. She
wrote, ‘‘The guy was hot and drunk sex is the best’’ (Participant #R-063,
questionnaire response), and she described enthusiastically participating in
the intercourse. (2007: 83)
Peterson and Muehlenhard are here referring to a woman who was
unable to consent at the relevant time, and who furthermore cannot be
assumed to have given consent prior to becoming intoxicated.11 As such
the experience described may be classiﬁed as an example of sexual victim-
ization under the Sexual Experiences Survey (SES), a 13-item measure used
by a number of studies, including Turchik et al. (2010), considered
below.12 Of course, in this particular instance the woman concerned had
no intention of making a complaint about what happened to her. But if we
start from the premise that active and direct consent serves as a bright line
between victimizing and non-victimizing sex, then Peterson and Muehlen-
hard’s decision to exclude the woman quoted above from their ‘‘rape
group’’—because her case ‘‘seemed’’ to the researchers not to be noncon-
sensual—must be troubling, since it amounts to saying that in some cases
legally valid consent is not even necessary. Must we say, therefore, that the
researchers’ failure to condemn such an incident as sexual assault or rape
and to identify the woman as a crime victim is symptomatic of rape myth
10. An example of such a respondent, whom Peterson and Muehlenhard classify as
a victim of rape who failed to acknowledge her victimhood, is described thus: ‘‘Another
[respondent], who was drunk to the point of unconsciousness during the intercourse, wrote,
‘ . . .when I get drunk I am usually horney [sic] so I probably wanted it as bad as him’’’
(Petersen & Muehlenhard, 2007, p. 82).
11. Prior consent would be relevant for defending a rape or sexual assault charge in some
jurisdictions (such as England and Wales) although not in others (such as Canada).
12. Assuming the woman was conscious, the two situations relevantly deﬁned in the
Sexual Experiences Survey Long Form Victimization (SES-LFV) deﬁnes as victimizing are:
‘‘Using me sexually after I had taken drugs and was conscious but too incapacitated (out of
it) to give consent or stop what was happening’’ (f), and ‘‘Using me sexually after I had been
drinking alcohol and was conscious but too intoxicated (drunk) to give consent or stop what
was happening’’ (j). See Koss et al. (2007).
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acceptance, and an attitude that is unacceptably untroubled about male
exploitation of women who are incapable of giving consent?13
It is submitted here that such a response, while ostensibly one that errs
on the side of protection for the most vulnerable, would be the wrong one.
Furthermore, that such a reading of that study seems to be a logical impli-
cation of carceral feminist thinking is indicative of its clumsily totalizing
and essentializing approach to theorizing sexual experiences. Certainly,
being wary of analyses of sexual activity such as Peterson and Muehlen-
hard’s may promote critical engagement with the norms of consent-getting
in pursuance of more egalitarian, mutually pleasurable and less risky sexual
scripts than the traditional one (Coy et al. 201365; Beres 2010). But at the
same time, we must not lose sight of the danger that such wariness, when it
leads to particular studies being excluded from consideration, also pro-
motes a carceral agenda that is sometimes at odds with the subjective
experience and self-perception of potential ‘‘victims’’ themselves.
C. The Traditional Sexual Script and Gender Stereotypes
in Carceral Feminism
Having outlined the ‘‘cultural scaffolding’’ shared between sex (enacted
along the lines of the traditional sexual script) and rape (in its counter-
stereotype form, involving acquaintances, partners and ex-partners) it be-
comes clear how, in carceral feminist thinking, the roles of abuser and
victim may become solidiﬁed and hence sexual coercion mischaracterized.
It is a familiar starting point for studies on sexual victimization to assert
that, in general, men do the victimizing and women get victimized; that
this arrangement is deeply embedded within the fabric of our patriarchal
society and that a primary purpose of scholarship is to develop methodol-
ogies that allow this reality to be exposed and depicted most accurately.14
13. See, for example Temkin (2010), who claims that women who are ‘‘unable to express
lack of consent by words or actions’’ are excluded from the popular understanding of rape
due to the allegedly established and deeply ingrained belief that ‘‘a woman can always
withhold consent to sex no matter how drunk she is’’ (715–716). Since in the extreme case of
victim intoxication that Temkin refers to, this ‘‘belief’’ is so clearly nonsense (and Temkin
must be right to describe it as ‘‘defy[ing] common sense’’), she may be taken to be referring
to instances such as Peterson and Muehlenhard’s participant #R-063, quoted above, who
reported desiring un-consented-to sex.
14. The following three extracts are illustrative here: ‘‘rape and sexual violence function
as tools of social control through which men keep women in a state of fear [and at home]’’
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But does this mean that in terms of the meaning of these roles, perpetrator
and victim are necessarily gendered identities, and that victimization is
essentially a problem of masculinity? My concern here is not to try to rebut
the empirical claims about the relative numbers of men and women per-
petrating coercive behaviors, although there is research that suggests such
a line of argument may be warranted.15 But at the same time, there are
dangers here in conﬂating general trends and the facts of particular cases that
do not ﬁt this gendered picture. For example, Wallerstein (2009) reserves for
women alone the consequences of being made ‘‘vulnerable’’ and potentially
victimized by becoming intoxicated, and in this sense seems to turn the
feminine identity of the victim into a necessary truth. In combatting the
responsibilizing myth that a woman retains the capability for withholding
consent ‘‘no matter how drunk she is’’ (Temkin, 2010, p. 715), Wallerstein
depicts the self-intoxicated woman as necessarily in-capable (and hence vic-
timized by sex) no matter how determined and insistent she is either at the
time, beforehand, or afterward. Wallerstein achieves this 180 degree reversal
of mythical thinking by conﬂating ‘‘unable to consent’’ and ‘‘consented
where she would not have while sober’’ (333), describing as ‘‘a matter of
(normative) fact’’ her belief that a woman [and not a man] is incapable of
consenting in that instance (334, 335). A man who has sex with a woman
whose inebriation makes her liable to consent when she would not have done
while sober is ‘‘predatory’’ and law should not legitimize predation (337).
Although the double sexual standard in Wallerstein’s argument may
seem crude and clumsy to anyone that does not already share her (norma-
tive) vision, the framework of male aggressor–female victim is so well
(Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003, p. 111); ‘‘Research on sexual assault victimization
and perpetration has consistently found a gap between the percentage of women who report
experiencing coerced, unwanted sexual activity and the percentage of men who report
having coerced or forced a woman to engage in sexual activity’’ (Clark & Carroll, 2008, p.
616); ‘‘avoiding language like ‘rape’ [in studies of men’s self-reporting of sexual aggression] is
important because . . .men who engage in sexual aggression are even less likely [than
women] to use terms like ‘rape’ or ‘sexual assault’ to describe their behaviour. Less threat-
ening, more colloquial language is likely to produce more accurate responding than items
that rely on legal terms’’ (Strang, Peterson, Hill, & Heiman, 2013, p. 459).
15. See Russell and Oswald (2001) who, using a modiﬁed version of the SES to survey 285
female students in America, found that ‘‘[f]ifty-two (18.2%) participants reported engaging
in some type of verbal or physical coercive behavior to obtain sexual intercourse [including]
thirty (26.1%) women [who reported] ‘becoming so sexually aroused that they felt it was
useless to stop even though the partner did not want to have sex’’’ (108).
RAPE MYTHS AND SEXUAL SCRIPTS | 153
established that it seems to make other ways of looking at sexual coercion
difﬁcult. The few examples of feminist-informed empirical studies that
have tried to engage with the risk of this framework engendering stereo-
types underline this difﬁculty. For instance, Ellison and Munro (2009)
promisingly insist that it is problematic that most of the subjects of their
mock jury research seemed to assume that the traditional sexual script is
natural and inevitable (298). Similarly, Fagen and Anderson (2012) admon-
ish fellow researchers on sexual coercion for largely ignoring men’s experi-
ences of unwanted and coercive heterosexual contact. However, both of
these articles end up conﬁrming precisely the problems they identify.
Ellison and Munro (2009) cite ‘‘the excesses of male sexuality’’ as the cause
of unwanted sexual touching (302), and in this way pull back from the
potentially conﬂicting implication of their earlier approval of a minority of
jurors who voice a view that women as well as men are capable of being
sexually ‘‘predatory’’ (298). Fagen and Anderson (2012) meanwhile frame
men’s narratives about having been sexually coerced or taken advantage of
by a woman as illustrating, not coercion or victimization, but merely men’s
discomfort with and disdain towards (a) women who take the initiative in
sex, (b) woman who are ‘‘slutty,’’ and (c) women who pose a challenge to the
masculine desire and/or need for sexual control and dominance (262–263,
268–269).
Fagen and Anderson’s failure to ‘‘see around the corners’’16 of a theoret-
ical framework of male domination and female subordination is particu-
larly abject, given their claim to be responding to a dearth of empirical
studies on male experiences of victimization. In their study of male reports
of being sexually coerced, two examples of that failure are illustrative here.
One of their interviewees, Noah, describes an experience at the age of 18
that made him feel ‘‘ashamed and empty’’ and ‘‘coerced’’ after a female
driver who had picked him up while hitch-hiking suddenly pulled the car
over, wordlessly undid his trousers, and performed oral sex on him. Fagen
and Anderson’s analysis is far from sympathetic:
[H]e was not only complicit in the woman’s initiatives, but he also sought to
regain control over the situation by attempting to touch her sexually.
However the woman repeatedly refused these attempts, which made Noah
feel disempowered. (2012, p. 267)
16. A turn of phrase used in a comparable context by Halley (2008).
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A second interviewee, Tyler, describes how, at the age of 20, he passed out
at a party, and a girl he had met ‘‘realized that I was passed out and
basically did what she wanted to.’’ Noting that this made him feel ‘‘pissed
off ’’ when he found out later what had happened, Fagen and Anderson
do not admit of the possibility of victimization. Instead they read his
reaction as being motivated simply to reassert his dominant status as
a man over women in general: ‘‘his anger was associated with the fact
that he was not the one who (directly or indirectly) initiated the sexual
contact’’ (268). Sticking ﬁrmly to a framework in which only men can be
sexual aggressors and only women can be victims, a narrative about female
coercion and male victimization is simply not thinkable. That this is
problematic is exposed by empirical research indicating that coercion may
be less about masculinity as such than sex role enactment. Russell and
Oswald (2001) found that women who reported using verbally and/or
physically coercive strategies to gain sex from an unwilling male partner
were more likely to score highly on ‘‘femininity,’’ and the researchers
suggest that ‘‘excessively feminine, coercive women perceive their strate-
gies as being ‘seductive’ rather than coercive’’ and hypothesize that this
may reﬂect self-perceptions of ‘‘sexually coercive men high in masculinity’’
(112). A feminist theorization of the traditional sexual script provides a way
of seeing the latter (coercive male ‘‘seduction’’) as rape, potential rape, or
at least as rape-approving. But this gives us no such understanding of the
former (coercive female ‘‘seduction’’).
I I . QUEST ION ING THE PREVALENCE AND INFLUENCE
OF THE REAL RAPE MYTH
Arguably the single most important aspect of the traditional sexual script
for present purposes is the implications attributed to it as regards popularly
held attitudes and beliefs about rape. According to carceral feminist argu-
ments as characterized so far in this article, sexually coercive male behavior
is so deeply normalized that rape involving an intimate partner (Littleton,
2011; Rumney, 1999; Anderson, 2010), a promiscuous woman (Russell,
2013; Anderson, 2010), drunken sex (Gunby, Carline, & Beynon, 2013),
or emotional pressure (Russell, Oswald, & Kraus, 2011) may become invis-
ible. A variety of studies advance this view of a popularly endorsed and
scripted gulf existing between the myth of real rape and rape in its more
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typical forms17 that explains negative attitudes toward many rape complai-
nants and high attrition rates in rape trials. Rape myth acceptance has been
correlated positively in the research literature with such factors as being
male (Gray, Palileo, & Johnson, 1993; Newcombe, van den Eynde, Hafner,
& Jolly, 2008), being male and believing that sex is about power and
domination (Chapleau & Oswald, 2013), being male and believing that
women are generally more virtuous than men (‘‘benevolent sexism’’)
(Abrams et al., 2003; Masser, Lees, & McKimmie, 2009), being male and
not being on board with feminism, its importance, and the reasonableness
of its and women’s demands (‘‘hostile sexism’’) (Rudman, Fetterolf, &
Sanchez, 2013, Stahl, Eek, & Kazemi, 2010), being sexist generally (Duran,
Moya, Megias, & Viki, 2010), and believing that society and its systems are
currently just and fair (and consequently that people get what they deserve)
(Chapleau & Oswald, 2013).18
We may divide the research literature into a number of categories: mock
jury studies, vignette-response analyses, rape scripts, and nonempirical
(theoretical or meta-study) analyses. For the ﬁrst category, Ellison and
Munro, over the course of a number of articles, identify the real rape myth
(and its difference from ‘‘normal sex’’) as responsible for making juries
unduly sceptical of complainants in alleged acquaintance rape situations.
They report how the closer the facts of an alleged rape incident looked to
jurors’ notions of normal sex (speciﬁcally, involving a normal-seeming
rather than predatory man, taking place at her home rather than anywhere
too ‘‘seedy’’ (2009, p. 300), and seemingly following a ‘‘seduction script’’ as
opposed to that of a ‘‘prototypical rape’’ (2010, p. 794)), the more difﬁcultly
the jurors had in convicting. The researchers report that jurors seem to look
to signs that the incident in question may have been one of raunchy or
rough sex (2013, p. 319) as opposed to rape, in which the facts of the parties’
being, for example, former lovers recently separated, drinking wine
together in the woman’s own home (2013, p. 311–313), and there being only
superﬁcial marks and scratches on the woman’s body—all of which con-
tradict the real rape stereotype—are factors preventing jurors from con-
victing. Related to this ‘‘mock-jury’’ approach, but also distinct in some
17. The latter sometimes being referred to, in North American legal contexts at least, as
‘‘simple’’ rape (Panichas, 2006).
18. Confusingly, Gunby et al. (2013) report also that being female is positively correlated
with suspicion of the victim or complainant of ‘‘simple rape.’’
156 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 19 | NO . 2 | SPR ING 2016
important ways, vignette response studies try to determine how varying
certain factors affects the way people respond to a ﬁctional potential rape
scenario. An example of such a study is Schuller, McKimmie, Masser, and
Klippenstine (2010), which conﬁrms that popular perceptions of rape
victims are associated with gender and victim stereotyping. The study
reported that, when presented with a complainant who is a stereotypically
good or responsible mother, the victim’s visible emotions were signiﬁcant
in determining how favorably respondents regarded her complaint. Pre-
dictably, such complainants that behaved more like the stereotype of the
real rape victim—tearful and upset as opposed to calm and controlled—
were more likely to be regarded favorably.
Representing rape scripts research, Krahe´ and colleagues (2007) argue
that adolescents whose own imagined rape scripts re-tell a version of the
stranger rape script are less likely to acknowledge or recognize actual rape
and sexual coercion when it happens to them (317); Turchik et al. (2010)
conﬁrms this in the context of women’s experiences of sexual coercion,
reporting that some women may be less equipped to avoid and resist sexual
victimization if they are accustomed to thinking only of stranger or ‘‘blitz’’
rape; Lim and Roloff (1999) report that respondents were more likely to
regard ‘‘inappropriate’’ sexual behavior (e.g., sexual behaviors in situations
involving the giving or taking of alcohol or marijuana, where the male is
persistent or already involved sexually with someone else) to be short of rape
when they also indicated acceptance of the ‘‘rape script’’ in which the rapist
is a violent stranger (19). Littleton, Tabernik, Canales, and Backstrom’s
(2009) research on ‘‘hook-up’’ sex and the dangers of coercion in that
context found that young people drew distinctions between ‘‘bad hook-
ups’’ on the one hand (i.e., sex between loose acquaintances that goes
wrong somehow) and ‘‘rape’’ (i.e., stranger rape) on the other (800–802).
To be critical of sexist mythical thinking and of the disproportionate
impact it may have on women is of course a thoroughly justiﬁable response
to tackling prejudices that would stymie prosecutions of the much more
typical rape scenario. That failures of law enforcement to bring rapists to
justice and of juries to convict them are in one way or another explainable
by widespread acceptance of the real rape myth is within feminist discourse
a widely and regularly afﬁrmed view, and provides an important driving
force for calls for law reform and education. It should not be surprising
then that attempts to introduce doubts about whether rape myth accep-
tance does in fact represent the truth about popular attitudes and beliefs
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about rape are often regarded as a betrayal of this important project, and are
therefore met with ﬁerce rebuttals. For example, Conaghan and Russell
(2014) respond to Reece’s (2013) criticism of feminist rape myth acceptance
research in the strongest terms:
[H]er failure to engage with feminist literature on rape other than in the
narrowest, most exclusionary terms, yields an approach which impedes
rather than advances public understanding and panders to a kind of sim-
plistic thinking which cannot begin to grapple with the complexity of the
phenomenon that is rape. (27)
This sort of response may be indicative of a perfectly understandable
sense of frustration and unease amongst carceral feminists, for whom rape
myth acceptance is central to understanding rape and sexual assault in its
wider context. But to the extent that this understanding is both an inﬂu-
ential one and open to question, there are good reasons for pursuing those
questions and taking them seriously. These reasons have everything to do
with the real consequences for both women and men of allowing our
theorizations to become fossilized articles of faith that close out other
voices. At this point, therefore, this article offers criticisms of some exam-
ples of feminist rape myth acceptance research.
A. Criticisms of Rape Scripts Research
In some rape scripts studies for example, the inﬂuence of the real rape myth
is postulated from the fact that, when prompted to write about an imagined
‘‘typical’’ rape and a sexual encounter that goes ‘‘bad,’’ research subjects will
often distinguish between the two by imagining a rape that includes some
of the elements of the real rape myth (for example, by imagining it to occur
outside, or involving a pathological stranger), while generally not antici-
pating rape as a potential outcome of a casual sexual encounter that goes
‘‘bad.’’ An article by Littleton et al. (2009) provides an example of such an
approach, which by asking subjects for two separate narrative accounts,
may have encouraged this very discrepancy.19 Having been asked to pro-
duce a script imagining a ‘‘bad hook-up’’ scenario and a separate script
19. ‘‘Speciﬁcally, a sample of US college women provided written narratives describing
their ideas regarding typical rapes and typical bad hook-ups’’ (p. 795).
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imagining a rape scenario, it must be unsurprising that a large number of
respondents would write two different sorts of narratives. Does this mean
they endorsed rape myths? Perhaps, but equally they might have been led
by Littleton and colleagues’ instructions to think they would be short-
changing the researchers if they wrote to two very similar scripts.
Another example of rape-myth acceptance being drawn in questionable
ways from scripts research is Turchik et al.’s (2010) study of 339 under-
graduate college women in an American university. Turchik and colleagues
report that women’s imagined scripts of ‘‘an unwanted sexual advance’’ (78)
are a predictor of vulnerability to victimization20 when those scripts
included real rape elements such as ‘‘a severe outdoor assault perpetrated
by someone they knew less than a month’’ (81). In other words, women
who, when asked to write a script for an unwanted sexual advance that
included ‘‘real rape’’ elements, were more likely to report moderate or
severe sexual victimization both in their past (from the age of 14) and in
an eight-week follow-up period after submitting their narratives. Of course
differences in life experience may color an individual’s imagination. But
the study exposes a number of methodological difﬁculties involved in
drawing any deeper connection than this. Firstly, the study builds into
its analysis an assumption that an ‘‘unwanted sexual advance’’ is necessarily
experienced as victimizing; indeed ‘‘unwanted’’ is grouped together with
‘‘coercion’’ in the deﬁnition of a ‘‘moderate’’ level of sexual victimization
in these researchers’ own three-level coding scheme (78). Secondly, re-
ported instances of ‘‘victimization’’ are taken by the researchers to indicate
women’s failure to recognize ‘‘important risk cues’’ due to their falsely
believing in the myth of stranger ‘‘blitz’’ rape (82). Turchik and colleagues
do not go into detail about the precise nature of the actual sexual victim-
ization reported by the women, but assuming that this represents the
range of coercive and manipulative strategies identiﬁed in the SES, then
is the very opposite analysis not equally possible here? That is to say, in
reporting being sexually victimized, are those same women not demon-
strating that they really do recognize sexual coercions as such even if these
experiences do not ﬁt the stereotype of stranger rape, and hence that we
actually learn very little, if anything at all, from their imagined scripts?
20. Measured using the SES amongst other measures.
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B. Criticisms of Mock-Jury Research
Mock jury research similarly may be seen to downplay or overlook the
possibility that something other than myth acceptance and stereotyping
might explain jurors’ apparent failures to convict. Ellison and Munro
(2010) place a strong emphasis on the supposed ability of their mock jury
research to reveal the widespread inﬂuence of mythical thinking where
direct questioning is ineffective. People will typically be able to identify
and will explicitly disavow rape myths (including the real rape myth) when
asked about their attitudes directly. But placing them on a mock-jury and
tasking them with interpreting events constituting an alleged acquaintance
(or otherwise counter-stereotypical) rape indicates rape myth acceptance
working on a much deeper level. Ellison and Munro (2010) regard this
ﬁnding as an important break-through in identifying the prevalence and
impact of rape myth acceptance attitudes. However, there are also reasons
to be suspicious of just how much it can really tell us. In these ﬁnal pages of
this article, we examine two examples of the tendency to overdraw the
signiﬁcance of rape myth acceptance in mock jury research: ﬁrst, regarding
beliefs about the location of rape (since stereotypical real rape is supposed
to happen outside), and second, beliefs regarding the possibility of mis-
communication in counter-stereotypical situations.
Firstly then, Ellison and Munro (2009) are of course quite right to warn
of the implications of assuming an incident to be more likely rape if it takes
place outside or in a seedy public place like a hallway rather than in the
woman’s own home.21 But if we are to follow Ellison and Munro in
regarding that sort of thinking as evidence of jurors accepting the real rape
myth, we might also consider what implications this has for other feminist-
informed studies that seem to attribute signiﬁcance to location and setting.
What are we to make of, for instance, research by Berelowitz, Clifton,
Firmin, Culyurtlu, and Edwards (2013) warning that peer-on-peer sexual
assault by boys and young men on girls and young women takes place
‘‘often in public places such as stairwells and alleyways, as well as in their
own homes’’ (105)?
21. ‘‘Jurors emphasized the ‘inappropriate’, ‘seedy’, ‘desperate’, ‘animalistic’ and even
‘unnatural’ connotations of having sex in a hallway, and suggested that this location bol-
stered the complainant’s account, since had she consented to intercourse ‘she would have
invited him to a more comfortable environment’’’ (p. 299).
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If we are to be consistent with Ellison and Munro’s understanding of the
sorts of clues from which it is appropriate to draw conclusions about jurors’
rape-myth-accepting attitudes, should we read Berelowitz and colleagues as
trying to say that sexual assault takes place anywhere, and that stairwells,
alleyways, and the home are all simply and equally examples of what
‘‘anywhere’’ includes? This would be an odd way to indicate that location
lacks signiﬁcance. But at the same time it is inconceivable to me that these
authors would admit to endorsing (albeit inadvertently) the real rape myth,
and I would be inclined to give them the beneﬁt of the doubt. What needs
to be borne in mind is that both Ellison and Munro’s jurors and Berelowitz
and colleagues are engaged in articulating the difference between rape and
consensual sex without the help of any obvious bright line of consent
explicitly given or refused. Given that crucial absence, it is not difﬁcult
to imagine that the un-homely and seedy locations referred to would have
served as a lightning rod to considerations of the nature of exploitative and
agency-limiting conditions. But it is something of a leap to move from this
to the conclusion that it is rape myth acceptance that is at work in one set of
deliberations but not the other. Being struck by the seediness of a location
and being alert to the possibility that sexual consent given in such circum-
stances might also carry the possibility of constraints upon a woman’s
freedom to consent, might well signify something about commonly
endorsed norms regarding the appropriate time and place for sex. But this
does not necessarily imply a belief that a woman who claims to have been
raped in her own home (i.e., somewhere regarded as being the appropriate
place for sex) is not to be believed.
A second implication of rape myth acceptance is that an alleged rape that
lacks the stereotypical qualities of real rape may be explained away and
excused as mere ‘‘miscommunication.’’ Two important examples of this
implication are attitudes toward incidents involving alcohol, and incidents
involving intimate partners whose sexual activities may not typically
involve communication about consent at all. To take the ﬁrst of these
examples, Gunby and colleagues (2013) argue that jurors will often wrongly
take the accused’s own intoxication into account in considering his ‘‘moral
responsibility’’ for his mistaken belief in consent, implying not only that
jurors are misapplying the law on reasonable mistaken belief, but also that
jurors are importing a foreign moral concept because they want to ﬁnd
some way to excuse men who rape (99–100). Finch and Munro (2007)
follow the same line of thinking in their mock-jury study involving an
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intoxicated complainant. Finch and Munro criticize jurors who were pre-
pared to believe that the accused simply ‘‘misunderstood’’ the woman’s
behavior, particularly if his (as well as her) judgement might have been
impaired by drink (603), so long as there was no evidence that he deliber-
ated got her drunk in order to take advantage of her. For both Gunby and
colleagues (2013) and Finch andMunro (2007), alcohol is a crucial aspect of
the scaffolding of ‘‘rape culture,’’ according to which intoxication is pop-
ularly regarded as reducing men’s responsibility while increasing women’s
responsibility, and encoding the normalization of male sexual aggression
against women. Against this context, to think of miscommunication as
explaining a complaint is simply another version of the story of rape myth
acceptance. This is because, for Finch and Munro, the sorts of distinctions
that jurors make when intoxication is part of the scenario—between vol-
untary and involuntary intoxication and between alcohol and date-rape
drugs—are all part of the discourse of victim-blame and of a general ‘‘dis-
approbation of female intoxication’’ (2007, p. 607).
The problem with that analysis is that, in reading the distinctions being
made by jurors as ﬁnding ways to blame the complainant or victim rather
than the defendant, Finch and Munro (2007) do not leave sufﬁcient room
for jurors to consider questions relevant to the accused’s guilt, including
mens rea. It is at the very least plausible to suppose that the mock jurors
criticized by Finch andMunro were trying to articulate something perfectly
appropriate: if there was evidence that the accused deliberately went out of
his way to get the complainant into a helpless state in order to have sex with her,
then evidence of mens rea might be more straightforwardly established. In
the absence of such evidence of the sort of malicious intent that we might
associate with the stereotypically pathological rapist, they are faced with the
more difﬁcult task of determining the accused’s guilty mind from a set of
clues that are (again) embedded within a traditional sexual and social script.
There is of course real value in Finch and Munro’s analysis in that it
highlights the danger that coercive strategies may exploit such a script by
hiding within it. As noted above, this is a danger recognized by Reece (2013)
in her critique of feminist rape myth research. However, Finch and Mun-
ro’s argument moves too quickly and too smoothly from (a) highlighting
the possibility that stereotypes might be affecting jurors’ consideration of
consent and mens rea against cultural norms, to (b) the conclusion that this
reveals sexist rape myth acceptance. This is not to suggest that there
is nothing problematic in such a culture or that rape myths play no role.
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But at the very least there is a question to be asked here with respect to the
persuasiveness and reliability of Finch and Munro’s framing of the possi-
bilities for miscommunication as a myth.
The second example of acceptance of the real rape myth leading to
acceptance of the miscommunication excuse involves intimate relation-
ships, and connects our discussion here once more with the empirical sex
research considered above. An accused man might contend that since he
and the complainant had become accustomed to silent, passive, or indirect
consent cues, he reasonably failed to realize on a particular occasion that
this response (or lack of response) actually constituted a lack of consent on
her part. One theme that comes through a number of the sex research
studies in terms of both beliefs and practise is that the perceived need for
explicit consent is inversely proportional to the degree of intimacy and
familiarity between the parties (Humphreys, 2007; Muehlenhard & Hick-
man, 1999; Vannier & O’Sullivan, 2011). However, since the real rape myth
anticipates a rapist to be the opposite of a committed sexual partner (i.e.,
a stranger), does crediting such beliefs and practises with legitimacy and
lawfulness amount to endorsing the myth? Certainly it is because mock
jurors look to signs of a pre-existing sexual relationship in discrediting
a complainant’s account that they are criticized for indulging in rape myth
acceptance (Ellison & Munro, 2009, 2013; Littleton et al., 2009; Littleton,
2011). And in cases in which consent is in doubt and in which the accused
tries to use the prior existence of a sexual relationship to bolster his
defense,22 appeal judges and (for example) media commentators have
been criticized as endorsing the myth that heterosexual relationships are
a context in which safety may be anticipated (Busby, 2012; Gotell, 2012;
Craig, 2014).23
22. As in, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court case involving erotic asphyxiation
and subsequent unconscious sex (R v. J.A. [2011] SCC 28).
23. In legal jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic, beyond those varieties of coercion
and agency-limiting conditions and strategies listed in rape and sexual assault statutes, the
question of what sorts of pressure and persuasion count as sufﬁciently coercive to invalidate
a complainant’s ability to consent is a matter of some debate. The problem of getting those
who may have used such pressure and/or persuasion to see their behavior as ethically or
legally problematic may account for discrepancies between studies indicating that men’s
self-reported uses of coercion is generally considerably lower than women’s self-reported
experiences of sexual victimization. See Strang et al. (2013) for a useful study on method-
ological challenges associated with this.
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However, without challenging the factual basis for the claim that
a rapist is more likely to be a current or former intimate partner than
a stranger, let me reiterate the criticism of this kind of thinking already
outlined. In ﬁnding the right way to frame the question of whether the
accused is guilty of rape or sexual assault, the combined dangers of
mythologizing, stereotyping, and essentializing represent a series of traps
on either side of us. On one side we would certainly be accepting a myth if
we were to say or imply that consent is less of an issue in the case of
partners or ex-partners than of strangers. But on the other side, to exclude
contextual matters that would indicate the possibility of consent or a belief
in consent and hence an absence of mens rea, transforms a perfectly
legitimate concern for highlighting victimization and where it happens
(i.e., in relationships) into an immutable and necessary Truth (Khan,
2014). The fact that we know from sex research studies that in established
sexual relationships consent-talk does become more dependent on non-
verbal and indirect cues (Humphreys, 2007; Vannier & O’Sullivan, 2011;
Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999) is certainly a cause for concern about an
apparent lack of awareness about the dangers of coercion within sexual
relationships. However, this same research must also be relevant for
reﬂecting on whether to categorize miscommunication as a false belief
(Hansen, O’Byrne, & Rapely, 2010; O’Byrne, Rapely, & Hansen, 2006)
or in fact a realistic possibility (Tadros, 2006, pp. 529, 541; Wallerstein,
2009, p. 335).24
Conaghan and Russell (2014) claim that feminist research on this topic is
always cognizant of rape myths as ‘‘time-bound and contextual,’’ and as
such a matter of empirical veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation rather than abstrac-
tion (33). But is this really a justiﬁable claim? If jurors’ reluctance to convict
when confronted with an apparent overlap between traditional sexual script
adherence and a rape allegation (or the reverse of that, as in the example
above of the implications to be drawn from a ‘‘seedy’’ location), is itself
taken to demonstrate rape myth acceptance, then this rather implies that
there is really ever only one right result in such a scenario. Far from
showing commitment to ‘‘context,’’ this sort of thinking shows instead
commitment only to an abstract theoretical framework informing a political
position.
24.Note that according to Gerger et al.’s (2007) deﬁnition of rape myths, characterizing
miscommunication as a myth would not necessarily require that it be proven untrue.
164 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 19 | NO . 2 | SPR ING 2016
CONCLUS ION
To the extent that the studies examined here premise their framing of rape
and sexual assault on a necessary connection between the traditional sexual
script and victimizing or coercive sex, they are open to legitimate concerns
and criticisms. In offering its critique, this article should not be taken as
endorsing the traditional script itself, which is of course problematic and
even dangerous in many ways. For example, it fails to guarantee mutuality
or equality in the roles played and the degrees of pleasure for men and
women, and it fails in any obvious way to ensure that sexual behaviors are
non-coercive and non-victimizing. We must certainly acknowledge that
a good deal of sexual behavior following the traditional script anticipates
a passive female who participates without enthusiasm or expectation of
pleasure; but that is something different to coercion, and limitations on
space prevent a full exploration of that distinction here.25 This article also
acknowledges the empirical possibility of women themselves mis-
categorizing their experiences as consensual because they are unable or
unwilling to acknowledge that a trusted friend or partner may have coerced
them. In anticipating that consent will not always be directly communi-
cated (if it is communicated at all), this is a script that shares its basic
scaffolding in part with rape. But the central argument of this article has
been that this is a matter of overlap rather than equivalence; notwithstand-
ing these admitted constraints and the dangers that coercion may be
obscured by the traditional script in particular contexts, research on con-
sent cues suggests that authentic sexual agency remains possible. Whether
an alleged instance of sexual victimization really is so is hence a matter of
factual demonstration in that particular case.
This article is fully in agreement with removing sexist stereotypes from
jury deliberations and from perceptions of rape and its perpetrators and
victims generally. However, in pursuing this project with a carceral objective
in mind, we should be wary about replacing one set of myths and stereotypes
(that applies abstract patriarchal norms to undermine the credibility of com-
plainants and sympathy for victims) with another (that applies abstract
gender norms to narrow the defendant’s ability to defend himself). The
argument of this article is offered, not to oppose perspectives on criminal
justice that are informed by feminist theorizations and empirical studies, but
25. See Dripps (1994, p. 139–147).
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to argue that, like all important insights, those advanced in the cause of
gender justice must remain self-critical in light of the limitations that come
with contextual differences between cases. Unless we are prepared to crim-
inalize non-victimizing and non-coercive sexual behaviors, then it may be
necessary to accept that, in judging instances of alleged sexual coercion and
victimization, there is a legitimate place for indirect and potentially ambiv-
alent signs and cues (Munro, 2005, p. 348–350). It seems tome implausible to
insist that the sex research literature does not at the very least call into
question some of the more abstracting approaches to victimizing and coer-
cive sex in the feminist studies identiﬁed in this article. As Cameron-Lewis
and Allen (2013) argue, we cannot rule out in advance the possibility of sexual
behaviors that embrace the danger of coercion and misunderstanding.
A truly critical approach to determining when to treat any particular act as
a criminal one must take this into account.
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